Collective identities, European solidarity : identification patterns and preferences for European social Insurance by Nicoli, Francesco et al.
Collective Identities, European Solidarity: Identiﬁcation
Patterns and Preferences for European Social Insurance*
FRANCESCO NICOLI,1 THERESA KUHN2 and BRIAN BURGOON2
1University of Gent, Gent 2University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam
Abstract
A degree of collective identity is often perceived to be a requirement for integration of core
state powers, and even more so when redistributive measures are at stake. Existing research
has shown that European identity is an important correlate of support for European social
policy in general. This article explores the ways in which collective identities relate to the
multidimensional nature of social policy at the European level. We explore in particular the
features of European social policy that receive the most support from European publics, and
how local, national and European identity moderates these preferences. We expect that people
who have primarily sub-national or national attachments are less supportive of generous
schemes and schemes that involve greater cross-country redistribution, and are more in favour
of decentralized schemes administered by the member states than those with stronger European
identities. We ﬁnd support for these expectations in a conjoint survey experiment ﬁelded in
autumn 2018 in 13 EU member states.
Keywords: European social policy; conjoint analysis; survey experiment; core state powers; European
identity
Introduction
The Euro and migration crises have sparked increased efforts to Europeanize social
policy-making. Policy-makers and academics have presented proposals for introducing
EU-level social policy beneﬁts, including policies providing unemployment beneﬁt
schemes and reinsurance mechanisms for the unemployed. These proposals, that can be
collectively called European unemployment risk sharing (EURS), differ on many dimen-
sions, including the degree of redistribution that they entail; the degree of individual and
country-level conditionality; whether contributions are used to simply strengthen national
unemployment beneﬁts or to provide education and training subsidies and who will ﬁ-
nance the scheme.
A commonly assumed political requirement for any given combination of such
proposals is that a modicum of collective identity is needed to embrace new
European-level provisions. This applies to any integration of core state powers
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2016), but even more so when redistributive measures
or other forms of solidarity are at stake. A major problem, however, is that European
identity formation is taking place at a much slower pace than European institution-
building, creating a tension between community and the scope of governance (Hooghe
and Marks, 2009).
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Against this backdrop, researchers have studied the relationship between European
identities and European social policy in general (Börner and Eigmüller, 2018; Gerhards
et al., 2016; Lahusen and Grasso, 2018; Verhaegen, 2018). They have also explored sup-
port for speciﬁc forms of solidarity, including European unemployment beneﬁt schemes
(Dolls and Wehrhöfer, 2018; Ferrera and Brunelli, 2019). However, we do not know what
kind of European social policies receive public support or opposition, and which aspects
of these policies are relevant to having a collective identity, indeed, collective identities,
given the multidimensional nature of collective identities and European social policy
(Baute et al., 2018).
In this article, we take such plural identities and policies seriously, asking how differ-
ent ideal-types of local, national and European identities – as laid out in the introduction
of this special issue – moderate support for policy proposals for European unemployment
beneﬁts schemes that differ with respect to six dimensions: their generosity; country-level
conditionality; individual conditionality; cross-country redistribution; ﬁnancing and gov-
ernance. We expect that questions of collective identity are most relevant to the dimen-
sions that refer to national sovereignty, such as whether these policies are governed by
the member states themselves, or are in the control of EU institutions, and the dimensions
that touch upon questions of solidarity, such as cross-border redistribution.
We test our hypotheses using a conjoint analysis survey ﬁelded in 2018 in 13 EU
member states. Our ﬁndings show that the impact of collective identities on preferences
for European integration of social security varies both across levels of identiﬁcation and
across dimensions of EURS. Individuals with national and more local identities are not
necessarily opposed to EURS schemes but they do prefer packages that retain national
oversight and avoid redistribution across countries. Conversely, individuals with a stron-
ger European identity hold favourable views of packages that include European-level ad-
ministration and cross-border redistribution.
I. European Unemployment Risk-sharing
Despite the many new policies and institutions introduced since 2010, the European Mon-
etary Union remains vulnerable to asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. When asymmetric
shocks hit countries with a limited ﬁscal capacity to adjust, their citizens may suffer, as the
absence of external monetary adjustment (which is often impossible in a single currency
zone) cannot be credibly and sustainably compensated for by domestic ﬁscal policy and au-
tomatic ﬁscal stabilizers. To address this structural problem, many overhauls of the Euro-
pean Monetary Union have been proposed. Most of them concern the ﬁnancial aspects of
economic stability. Proposals include introducing eurobonds (VonWeizsäcker and Delpla,
2010); establishing a European monetary fund and a European ﬁnance minister (Enderlein
and Haas, 2015) and strengthening macroeconomic coordination (European Commission,
2013; European Council Conclusions, October 2014; Nicoli, 2016; Van Rompuy, 2012, p.
9). The goal of these proposals is not to provide directly a European layer of protection for
vulnerable citizens in weaker economies but to ensure that domestic ﬁscal stabilizers re-
main effective while making asymmetric shocks less likely altogether. While they may
be effective, such proposed solutions often fail to garner substantial public support.
Against this backdrop, a number of scholars have suggested a form of European-level
support for unemployed people across the continent (see for instance Beblavý and
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Lenaerts, 2017; Dullien, 2014). These proposals, initially ﬂoated by the President of the Eu-
ropean Council Herman Van Rompuy in the midst of the Eurocrisis (Van Rompuy, 2012),
are often named European unemployment beneﬁt schemes or, more broadly, EURS
schemes. EURS schemes have attractive features: they work as automatic stabilizers in
cases of asymmetric shocks, and may also be perceived as being closer to the people. Fur-
thermore, the introduction of a EURS scheme would complement existing tools for an EU-
wide social policy, such as the European pillar of social rights. Introduced in 2017, the Eu-
ropean pillar of social rights aimed to reduce the fundamental asymmetry (Scharpf, 2002)
betweenmarket integration and domestic social protection without harming national auton-
omy. Its functioning is based, on the one hand, on a series of common objectives to be
achieved domestically (Zeitlin and Vanhercke, 2018), and on the other, on the progressive
convergence of social rights standards through directives. The pillar lacks, however, a gen-
uine European tier of shared social protection. The introduction of a EURS scheme would
not only contribute to the Eurozone’s macroeconomic stability but would also be an act of
cross-border solidarity, building up a European-level layer onto national social policy. A
EURS scheme constitutes, therefore, a suitable policy proposal to test the attitudes of Eu-
ropean citizens towards European-level social policy and solidarity.
Of course, in theory and in existing political discussions, different EURS proposals have
been described with very different policy characteristics. Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017) pro-
vide an overview of variants of EURS. Fundamentally, EURS schemes differ in whether
unemployed citizens receive support directly from a centralized instrument, regardless of
their residence (a genuine European unemployment beneﬁt scheme), or whether funding
is targeted to unemployed people in member states in distress (reinsurance schemes). The
model of EURS on which we focus combines features of both models. While the framing
of the experiment makes clear that the funding is tied tomember state performance (see An-
nex 2, ﬁgure 2), we kept the door open for both direct support from the EU to citizens and
more decentralized schemes managed by member states, in our administration dimension.
Capturing the full extent of all possible variations of EURS schemes is not suitable in a
survey design. However, we build on the work of Beblavý and Lenaerts (2017) and focus
on six dimensions of policy design: generosity, country-level generosity, individual-level
conditionality, cross-country redistribution, ﬁnancing and administration. The ﬁrst dimen-
sion – capturing the generosity of EURS schemes – refers to different replacement rates,
that is, the maximum proportion of the last wage of the unemployed person that will be
insured by the new scheme. The second dimension relates to country-level conditionality
arrangements on education and training. The next addresses the variations in policy
schemes with regard to individual-level conditionality. The fourth captures the fact that
existing proposals vary with respect to whether and to what extent they involve cross-
country redistribution. The ﬁfth dimension focuses on governance arrangements, asking
what governance level should administer the scheme. Finally, the last dimension captures
alternative options for domestic taxation, in other words, the ﬁscal impact of the EURS
scheme on the national taxation system. The operationalization of these dimensions in this
conjoint experiment is discussed in Section III. This allows us to test a very wide range of
different policy options, ranging from pure reinsurance schemes (thus remaining very
close to the actual policy debate) to schemes featuring more direct forms of support (al-
though we fell short of testing genuine European unemployment beneﬁt schemes whose
activation is completely detached from employment performance at country level).
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II. Collective Identities and Support for European Social Policy: Sovereignty and
Solidarity
We aim to move beyond the nation versus Europe dichotomy and emphasize the different
ways in which identities at the regional, national and supranational level can be combined
and how these combinations play out with respect to support for European social policy.
As Risse (2010) puts it, ‘we need to know how the many “we’s,” the groups to which we
feel attached, relate to each other’. The evolution of European identity and its relationship
with the process of European integration has been well explored in recent research
(Fligstein et al., 2012; Fligstein and Polyakova, 2015; Kuhn, 2019; Risse, 2010). For a
review of this literature, see Kuhn and Nicoli (2020) in the introduction to this special
issue.
European identity should not be seen as synonymous with support for European inte-
gration (Kuhn 2019), itself a multidimensional phenomenon (Stoeckel, 2013). People
may identify as European or feel attached to the European continent, and at the same time
disagree with European integration or with particular policies. With respect to European
social policy, European identity may be too superﬁcial to translate fully into solidarity
with other Europeans. While most of the literature suggests that identiﬁcation patterns
are increasingly important determinants of support for European integration (Carey,
2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2005), Hobolt and Wratil, (2015) found that while identities
play a role, economic concerns remain paramount.
Either way, early research on European identity presupposed that national and Euro-
pean identity would compete with and exclude each other. For example, classical
intergovernmentalism saw the persistent power of national identities as an obstacle to Eu-
ropean integration (Cederman, 2001; Kuhn, 2019). More recent research, however, ar-
gues that regional, national and European identities can be compatible, and that
individuals can have multiple identities, that is, ‘the concurrent identiﬁcation with multi-
ple socially or geographically-deﬁned groups’ (Steenvoorden and Wright, 2018, p. 3).
Following the set-up of Kuhn and Nicoli (2020), we conceptualize the multi-level
character of collective political identities by building on Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez’s
(2001) concept of nested identities. Individuals with multi-level identities can have many
different attachments; local, national and European, that can be combined in several ways.
Kuhn and Nicoli’s (2020) introduction identiﬁes six ideal-types of possible relationships
among these identities. We focus here on the three general ideal-types (Figure 1) (leaving
out the three ‘special’ cases (see Kuhn and Nicoli, 2020). Individuals with what we shall
call ‘localist identities’ feel most strongly attached to their intra-national region, and less
so to their nation or to Europe.1 Individuals with ‘nationalist identities’ have a national
attachment that is stronger than both their regional and supranational attachments. Indi-
viduals with ‘European identities’ have attachments to Europe that are stronger than to
other levels of political community.
Research exploring attitudes towards national welfare states identiﬁes (in broad terms)
ideologies, perceived outcomes and attitudes towards disadvantaged groups as key deter-
minants of support for welfare states (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Svallfors, 2010;
1We prefer the term localist to parochials to avoid the pejorative connotation of the latter. We prefer localist to regionalist to
indicate that the category we are interested in is the local regional form within nations, not one that cuts across nations.
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Van Oorschot et al., 2012). However, the inherently multi-level nature of European social
policy invites a reﬂection not only on the impact of fundamental redistributive atti-
tudes, but on the level of community in which individuals locate themselves. Indeed,
a growing body of research has shown that individuals with a European identity are
more likely to support European social policy than people who hold exclusively na-
tional identities. Lahusen and Grasso (2018) and Verhaegen (2018) report that there
are signiﬁcant relationships between European identity and support for ﬁscal solidarity
with member states suffering economic difﬁculties. Furthermore, Gerhards et al. (2016)
show that European identity is also linked to support for European-level welfare states.
Similarly, Bechtel et al. (2014) ﬁnd that Germans with more cosmopolitan outlooks are
more supportive of international bailouts. Using laboratory experiments in Germany
and the UK, Kuhn et al. (2018) found that people who identify as European are more
likely to share resources with anonymous recipients from other European member
states than people who don’t identify as European. Only Hooghe and Verhaegen
(2017) ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relationship between European identity and support for Eu-
ropean social policy.
While these contributions have been essential in clarifying the relationship between
collective identities and support for European social policy, they have studied only
whether collective identity is related to European social policy support in general. How-
ever, attitudes towards European social policy are inherently multidimensional, similar to
attitudes towards national welfare systems (Gelissen and Van Ooorschot, 2013). This de-
pends on the multidimensional nature of European social policy itself, involving several
dimensions, such as the generosity of the scheme, governance, and cross-border redistri-
bution. Different schemes may vary across a range of features, some of which may foster
support in some groups, while undermining support in others. It is thus important to dis-
entangle the effects of collective identity on support attributed to different dimensions of
policy design.
We expect that identities are linked to support for European social policy through
two main channels: general concerns with national sovereignty and concerns with the
Figure 1: Ideal-Types of Identiﬁcation.
Source: author’s adaptation from Kuhn and Nicoli (2020). Note that Kuhn and Nicoli (2020) use a
broader ideal-type labelling individuals with supranational attachment as ‘Supranationals’. How-
ever this article operationalizes the original conceptualization by using survey questions on Euro-
pean identity, we therefore opt for replacing ‘Supranationals’ with ‘Europeans’ in our discussion.
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boundaries of solidarity. Firstly, social policy and the welfare institutions have been
part of the core business of modern states (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2016). The es-
tablishment of a EURS scheme moves decision-making power away from member
states and towards a joint institution, thereby decreasing national sovereignty. It is
therefore likely that people with localist or national identities see a European social
policy as detrimental to national sovereignty. Secondly, social policy also relates to
questions of solidarity and of sharing resources with other people. As captured by
the concept ‘parochial altruism’, people’s willingness to share resources is bounded,
and often overlaps with, national or regional group boundaries (Kuhn et al., 2018).
Hence, people with localist or national identities may be reluctant to share resources
with other Europeans with whom they lack an emotional bond. Accordingly, of the
six policy dimensions of the conjoint experiment, our attention focuses on those that
directly express solidarity, such as the generosity of the scheme and country-level re-
distribution, and on the level of governance, which should capture fundamental con-
cerns with national sovereignty.
Given the link observed in the literature between solidarity and group identiﬁcation,
we consider that schemes with more generous features may garner more support among
those who see themselves as genuine Europeans; and even more so, when explicitly con-
sidering the cross-national redistributive implications of social policy. On these grounds,
our ﬁrst two hypotheses are:
H1: Individuals with European identities are more supportive of more generous packages
than are localists and nationals.
H2: Individuals with European identities are more supportive of cross-country redistribu-
tion than are localists and nationals.
Finally, it is important to single out the effect associated with the national versus the
EU level of governance of a EURS scheme. Even individuals without a strong attachment
to Europe may support a European-level social policy, because, for instance, they may see
themselves as the net beneﬁciaries of such a policy. However, even when support for EU-
level social policy is high, individuals without a strong European identity may be con-
cerned about potential losses in national sovereignty should the EURS be administered
at an EU rather than a national level. Conversely, those embracing a European identity
can be expected to be more comfortable with an EU-level administration, ceteris paribus.
To disentangle the effects associated with the relationship between governance arrange-
ments and identiﬁcation from other factors affecting support for EU-level social policy,
we hypothesized that:
H3: Localists and nationalists are more supportive of the national governance of EURS
schemes than are Europeans.
In other words, we expect that individuals with European identities are more likely to
support stronger European-level solidarity and are likely to be less concerned about the
loss of national sovereignty than localists and nationalists.
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III. Research Design and Methods
The Conjoint Experiment
To test our hypotheses, we use a conjoint experiment on EURS schemes. As introduced in
Section I, we model alternative EURS schemes across six dimensions. The ﬁrst dimen-
sion captures the generosity of the scheme by focusing on different replacement rates, that
is, the maximum proportion of the last wage of the unemployed person who will be in-
sured by the new scheme, featuring three levels (40, 60 and 70 per cent). The second di-
mension refers to country-level conditionality, that is, whether the EURS schemes should
have no conditions attached or instead that participating countries should have education
and training policies in place. Similarly, the third dimension captures individual-level
conditionality, either attaching no conditions to provision of beneﬁts, or requiring the in-
dividuals to accept ‘any suitable job offer or lose the beneﬁt’, or requiring them to apply
‘for at least one job per week, and accept any suitable job offer or lose the beneﬁt’. The
fourth dimension addresses the possibility of cross-country redistribution: (1) an insur-
ance option, which does not have a redistribution option, and the support receivable by
participating countries is capped by their own long-term contributions to the scheme;
(2) a tolerant option, where any country can receive more from the scheme than what it
contributed to it; and (3) a redistributive option, where only the poor countries are allowed
to draw more out from the scheme than they pay in, while rich countries would as a result
end up paying more than they receive. The ﬁfth dimension is the level of governance at
where the scheme is administered, either being solely managed by the respective national
administrations, or instead mandating a dedicated EU body to administer it. A sixth and
ﬁnal dimension refers to the scheme’s impact on domestic taxation: ‘no impact’, where
taxation remains the same; ‘taxes will increase for everyone of 0.5 per cent of their in-
come’, capturing a ﬂat distribution of potential costs; and ‘taxes will increase of 1 per cent
of the income, but only for the rich’, capturing a progressive spreading of the scheme’s
potential costs.
Fieldwork was conducted by IPSOS with a representative online survey ﬁelded in 13
EU member states: Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany, Austria, Spain,
Poland, Hungary, Finland, Denmark, Ireland and Estonia.2 To ensure that the sample
was representative, we included population-sample quotas for age, gender, education
and regional distribution before drawing a random sample of 1500 individuals in each
of the 13 countries.3
Conjoint experiments are well suited to analyse preferences towards alternative pol-
icy proposals. Respondents can choose between different policy options (or packages)
that vary across different dimensions; in turn, each dimension can take different levels,
hence (1) leading to many possible alternatives, and (2) allowing a causal reading of
the effect of dimensional change on preferences across policy packages (Hainmueller
et al., 2014). Recent applications of this method to solidarity research include the work
by Bechtel et al. (2014, 2017) who investigated German attitudes towards Eurozone
bailouts, and Gallego and Marx (2017) who investigated preferences for alternative
2The survey was ﬁelded in all 13 countries from 22 October 2018 to 9 November 2018.
3The deviations from the demographic composition of a population remain within 4 percentage points for most variables
and countries, except for Hungary where it is a couple of percentage points higher.
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labour market policies in Spain. Building on the methodological insights of these
contributions, as well as on actual policy proposals, we set up a set of synthetic models
of European unemployment risk-sharing that varies across six different dimensions.
The aim was to capture the variety of EURS policy designs and to ensure that we
could grasp the fundamental political attitudes (for instance, towards conditionality or
generosity) of the respondents. To avoid cognitive biases as well as to maintain the
attention of the respondents, the wording and framing of the experiment was kept as
short as possible.
The respondents ﬁrst received some general information on the context and aims of
EURS (Annex 2, ﬁgure 1). The actual conjoint experiment then took place immediately
after the framing. Respondents were confronted with three pairs of EURS policy packages
consisting of the six policy dimensions discussed in Section I (Annex 2, ﬁgure 2). For
each pair, the respondents were asked to provide the information that constitutes the main
dependent variables of this analysis. They were asked to indicate which of the two pack-
ages they preferred (the choice variable) and how they rated each individual package (rat-
ing variable) on a scale ranging from being very much against to very much in favour of
it. The six dimensions were presented in a random order to the respondents to avoid any
ordering effect; but once the order was established for each respondent, it was maintained
across the different conjoint iterations.
Operationalization
Dependent variables. The data collected in the survey experiment allow two different de-
pendent variables: package choice, on the one hand, asks respondents to identify which of
the packages they prefer; package score, on the other hand, asks respondents to rate each
package from very much against to very much in favour. We estimate our baseline models
using the choice variable, as it is the variable with the clearest experimental nature since it
forces the respondent to make a choice. For robustness purposes, however, we test our
main hypotheses using alternative variables and speciﬁcations.
Independent variables. As it is customary for conjoint designs, the main independent
variables are the six dimensions of the conjoint experiment themselves, that act as genu-
inely exogenous treatments on the respondents. We interact these six dimensions with the
respondents’ ideal-types. Collective identities (at regional, national and European level)
are operationalized using the following question: ‘on a score from 0 to 10, how much
do you feel attached to … [your region/your country/Europe]’. To construct an indicator
that captures not only the absolute level of identiﬁcation with a certain level of territorial
unity but also the relationships between them (see Kuhn and Nicoli, 2020), the attachment
variable is treated to model the ideal-types of multi-level identiﬁcation: localists,
nationalists and European identiﬁers (Kuhn and Nicoli, 2020, Figure 1). To do so, three
variables are constructed to sort individuals according to their predominantly local
(localists), national (nationalists) or European attachment (Europeans). In each case,
the value for the attachment question (regional, national or European, respectively), is
to be higher than the two others. To operationalize this without losing the variation
within each category, the three variables are created so to gauge the difference between
the highest score (European, nationalist or localist attachment) and the second highest
one of the two others. The localist score of an individual is positive when the local
Identity & solidarity: Evidence from EURS 83
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
attachment is higher than both the European and national attachment; the national score
is larger than 0 when the national attachment is higher than both the local and European
attachment; the European score is larger than 0 when the European attachment is larger
than both the national and local attachment. Higher scores capture more exclusive attach-
ment to the polity in question with respect to the two other levels of community: For
instance, if the localist score of an individual is 5, this means that there are at least ﬁve
points of difference between it and the second-highest attachment score in the answer.
Among respondents with a single predominant identity (about 60 per cent of the total
sample), about 29 per cent have a predominantly localist identity, about 57 per cent have
a predominantly nationalist identity and about 14 per cent have a predominantly
European identity.
Control variables. Our models control for respondents’ age, gender (operationalized
by a dummy variable), and education (standardized by the nine ISCED-11 categories)
and income (standardized by country-speciﬁc, family-adjusted income deciles). They in-
clude a dummy variable for whether the respondent is currently unemployed. We include
country-ﬁxed effects in all speciﬁcations without a multi-level structure to ensure that any
country-level variability is taken into account. In certain robustness checks we account for
the multi-level structure of our dataset.
IV. Results
We use several techniques to estimate how collective identities moderate the effect of
EURS policy dimensions on preferences over unemployment beneﬁts (Table 1,
Figure 2). In particular, models 1–3 in Table 1 test our underlying hypotheses H1–H3
by splitting the sample in subsamples that cluster individuals according to their ideal-
types. As our conjoint conditions are experimentally derived and orthogonal from one
another, these baseline models are simple ordinary least squares regression estimations
(Hainmueller et al. 2014), with clustered standard errors and the full set of controls
(including country dummies). To ensure the maximal validity of results, we exclude
respondents who failed an attention check at the end of the survey, together with those
who failed twice or more to provide a consistent answer between package choice and rat-
ing (that is, who ﬁrst preferred a certain policy package over another but then rated it more
negatively than the other). The sample is split according to the three identity ideal-types;
these models are simple regression, split-sample models on the binary choice variable. To
measure the variation in intensity within each score, the score is interacted with the
dimensions.4
Levels of identiﬁcation and ideal-types
Models 1–3 in Table 1 test our hypotheses on the various strength of traction that the
conjoint dimensions could have on individuals with a localist, nationalist or European
identiﬁcation. We expect individuals with a strong European identiﬁcation to prefer more
generous packages (H1) with cross-border redistributive elements (H2) and European
governance (H3), compared with those with strong localist or nationalist identiﬁcation.
The subsamples for each of the ideal-types of identiﬁcation are split so as to only focus
4Note that for all models the coefﬁcients for the country ﬁxed effects are not shown.
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on those individuals who have a positive score in each ideal-type. Table 1 and Figure 2 are
based on these models. A second set of models instead codes individuals who do not ﬁt in a
speciﬁc subsample as 0. Figure 3 (interaction effects) and Figure 4 (preferred packages) are
based upon this alternative coding for clarity of presentation. Figure 3 shows the marginal
effects of the interactions for the three dimensions that are relevant for H1–H3.
Table 1 and Figure 2 show that individuals with superior nationalist or localist attach-
ment are, on average, far more supportive of the national governance of EURS than those
Table 1: Baseline Estimations, by Identity Ideal-Type







Generosity (base level: 40%) 60% 0.114 0.113 0.123
(16.82)*** (19.95)*** (13.78)***
70% 0.152 0.145 0.171
(21.57)*** (24.62)*** (18.81)***
Country conditions






(base level: no redistribution)
All countries 0.007 0.011 0.047
(1.00) (2.05)** (5.33)***
Rich to poor 0.015 0.018 0.057
(2.19)** (3.24)*** (6.46)***
Increase in taxation
(base level: no increase)
0.5% for everyone 0.058 0.067 0.048
(8.83)*** (12.07)*** (5.47)***














Controls Low education 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.33) (0.98) (0.57)
Income 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.07) (1.36) (1.78)*
Unemployed 0.000 0.000 0.001
(0.37) (0.07) (0.91)
Age 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.31) (0.31) (0.72)
Female 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.20) (0.54) (0.73)
Country ﬁxed effects omitted
_cons 0.299 0.303 0.310
(32.97)*** (39.38)*** (26.31)***
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04
N 39990 56904 22944
Notes: coefﬁcients of ordinary least squares estimates and individual-clustered standard errors in parenthesis. *P< 0.1;
**P < 0.05; ***P < 0.01.
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with a predominantly European attachment. Interaction effects here are telling (panel c in
Figure 3): the more exclusive the national or European attachment becomes, the wider the
gap between the two grows. Hence, we ﬁnd substantial support for H3.
Similarly, the models shown in Table 1 and Figures 2 and 3 show clearly that individ-
uals with nationalist and localist identities view less favourably schemes with clear cross-
country redistributive features than those with European identities. European identiﬁers
are about twice as supportive of cross-country redistribution than individuals whose iden-
tiﬁcation is primarily national and about 3.5 times more supportive than localists. Fur-
thermore, the more exclusive nationalist or localist attachment becomes (that is, the
larger the variable becomes5), the more critical individuals become of cross-country redis-
tribution (panel b in Figure 3). This aligns with our expectations in H2.
The relationship between generosity and collective identities (H1) is less clear-cut. As
shown in Figure 2, all individuals – regardless of their identiﬁcation – favour generous
packages over parsimonious ones. The conﬁdence intervals of the average effects overlap
to some extent (being signiﬁcantly different only between European identiﬁers and na-
tionalists), suggesting that identiﬁcation does not play a pivotal role here. On average,
we therefore did not ﬁnd strong evidence in support of H1: generous packages are on av-
erage liked by all sorts of individuals, regardless of their identiﬁcation. Nonetheless, panel
a in Figure 3 shows that when identities become increasingly exclusive, the gap between
European identiﬁers (who favour generous schemes more) and nationalists (who favour
generous schemes slightly less) widens. This suggests that – at least for individuals with
5Larger variable scores indicate a larger gap between the individuals’ attachment (at the European, national or regional
level) and the second highest score of the remaining two.
Figure 2: Average Main Effects by Ideal-Types. [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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very exclusive identities— a generous scheme could make a difference in their evaluation
of a package.
To ensure that our estimates are reliable and valid, we carry out an array of robustness
checks.6 These include (1) the dependent variables (using instead of the package choice
variable, the scoring variable – both in its ﬁve categories formulation and its binary trans-
formation); (2) the controls used (including additional controls and no controls at all); (3)
the sample size (including inconsistent and inattentive respondents) and the estimators
(including logit for the binary outcomes and ordered logit for the ordinal outcomes and
the multi-level random intercept and random coefﬁcient models). The baseline results pre-
sented in the tables and ﬁgures remain very stable across these alternative speciﬁcations.
Figure 3: Interaction Effects for Dimension of Interest, by Ideal-Types.
Notes: The plot reports the marginal effects for cross-country redistribution (left) and national gov-
ernance (right) at each level of localist, national and European attachment. [Colour ﬁgure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
6These alternative estimates are summarized in Annex 5.
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Most Favoured Packages
The differences in preferences for a EURS scheme across our three identity groups can be
clariﬁed further by considering predicted level of support for a given EURS policy pack-
age – not just the marginal increase in support. This is important to explore, not least be-
cause an actual political debate can be expected to combine a range of features of policy
design where voters can embrace or eschew a full combination. Our hypotheses are that
EU beneﬁt schemes that provide more generous assistance, more between-country redis-
tribution and EU level of governance should be more strongly supported by respondents
identifying as Europeans than by nationalists or localists. We explore these arguments by
analysing further whether respondents strongly identifying with one or another of the
three identity groups embrace package combinations in line with H1–H3.
In such an exercise it is useful to rely on models that include the full samples and then,
within those samples, to focus on the (putatively different) support patterns across the
localist, nationalist and European identity groups. To do so, we again take the choice
of package as the outcome variable of interest and we consider how a given identity score
moderates the way that the characteristics of packages inﬂuence the probability of
Figure 4: Predicted Support for European Union Beneﬁt Scheme, by Identity Ideal-Type and
Dimension.
Francesco Nicoli, Theresa Kuhn and Brian Burgoon88
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
choosing any given package. Based on such regressions, we can then surmise
counterfactually the predicted likelihood that those strongly identifying as localists versus
nationals versus Europeans choose a EURS package. And we can predict how such sup-
port varies across packages that themselves vary with respect to their generosity (relevant
to H1), to country-level redistribution (relevant to H2) and to a European or national level
of administration (relevant to H3) – averaged across all other aspects of packages in the
experiment.
Figure 4 summarizes the most important results of such models. Figure 4a–c (generos-
ity) shows the predicted support across packages that vary with respect to generosity (40,
60 or 70 per cent of last wage). H1, for which our earlier analysis provided the weakest
and most sensitive result, does get some modest support in the analysis of ideal typical
packages. We see that all identity groups are more likely to support more generous pack-
ages than less generous ones, all other things equal. But we see that the sensitivity of Eu-
ropean identiﬁers to variations in the generosity of packages is greater than that of either
localists or nationalists – reﬂected in the steep increase as one moves from the least to the
most generous packages to which the respondents were exposed. And more importantly
perhaps, we also see that European identiﬁers are more likely to choose the most gener-
ous packages than are either localists or, particularly, nationalists. The differences are
quite modest, to be sure, but they are in line with our expectations articulated in H1.
Figure 4d–f show how our identity groups vary with respect to different levels of
between-country redistribution. Recall that our experiment presented respondents with
three possibilities: no redistribution; redistribution where any country can draw more on
the new beneﬁts programme than they pay in; and redistribution where poor countries
can do so but rich countries cannot. Here, we ﬁnd stronger support for the H2 pattern,
where Europeans are signiﬁcantly more likely than localists and nationalists to support
beneﬁt packages that involve redistribution between rich and poor countries. The pattern
supports this in that the increased likelihood of supporting more redistributional packages
than less redistributional ones is much sharper and clearer for Europeans than for either
nationalists or localists whose propensity to support a package does not increase at all
as one moves from the less to the more redistributional design. The pattern also supports
the view that Europeans are signiﬁcantly more likely to support the most redistributive
forms of EU-level beneﬁt schemes than their localist and nationalist counterparts.
Finally, Figure 4g–i show the starkest difference in the stances of Europeans,
localists and nationalists in their support for European beneﬁt packages when the pro-
gramme is administered at the national or the EU level of governance. The models un-
ambiguously predict that support by both localists and nationalists for packages that
ensure national-level governance is substantially higher than for packages that are ad-
ministered at the EU level. This pattern is stronger for nationalists than for localists,
but in both cases the distinction is stark and statistically signiﬁcant. For European
identifers, on the other hand, the pattern is the opposite: they are statistically and sub-
stantively much more likely to support EURS packages that are administered at the EU
level than those administered at the national level. All told, the patterns provide sub-
stantial support for H2 and 3, and modest support for H1.
Figure 5 pools this information and focuses on ideal typical packages that combine the
features discussed above. Figure 5, based on the same modelling strategy as Figure 4,
shows the counterfactual likelihood that each of the identity groups will choose or support
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Figure 5: Predicted Support for Less or More Generous, Redistributive or Supranational European
Risk-sharing Schemes, by Identity Ideal-Type.
Francesco Nicoli, Theresa Kuhn and Brian Burgoon90
© 2020 The Authors. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies published by University Association for Contemporary European Studies and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
EURS packages that are less or more generous, redistributive and EU-governed. For
each identity group (localists in Figure 5a, nationalists in Figure 5b and Europeans in
Figure 5c), we consider three characteristics. The ﬁrst (ﬁrst column in 5a, 5b and 5c)
predicted support for a package that is the least generous with respect to replacement rate
(40 per cent), does not redistribute between countries, and is administered at the national
level. The second column shows support for beneﬁt packages with medium replacement
rate (60 per cent), some redistribution by allowing any country to draw out more than they
put in, and EU-level administration. The third column is for a package with the most
generous (70 per cent) replacement rate, rich-to-poor-country redistribution and EU-level
administration. Our expectation, surmised from H1 to H3, is that the Europeans – more
than their localist or nationalist counterparts – would become increasingly and most sub-
stantially supportive of the more generous, redistributive and EU-governed package.
This is precisely the pattern that emerges from the analysis. One can clearly see that
the propensity to support the proposed packages increases more for the European
identiﬁers than the others as one moves towards the most generous, redistributive and
EU-governed assistance. Those strongly identifying as localists also prefer the more
generous, redistributive and supranational combination. But that difference is more
modest than it is among those strongly identifying as European. Also, the likelihood
of Europeans to support the most generous combination in EURS packages is between
10 and 20 percentage points higher than it is for those strongly identifying as localist or
nationalists. We interpret such patterns as supporting our broad line of argumentation –
beyond the more disaggregated patterns focused on either generosity, or redistribution,
or level of administration.
Conclusion
Existing research has repeatedly shown that European identity is an important correlate of
support for European social policy (Bechtel et al., 2014; Gerhards et al., 2016; Kuhn
et al., 2018). While these studies have explored support for European social policy-
making in general, this article emphasizes the multidimensional nature of social policy
(Gallego and Marx, 2017). More concretely, it asks what kind of European-level social
policy Europeans might prefer, and how having a predominantly local, national or Euro-
pean identity moderates these preferences. To do so, the study draws on an original con-
joint experiment conducted in 13 European member states in the autumn of 2018.
Supporting H1–H3, our analyses show that, compared with exclusive nationalists, Eu-
ropean identiﬁers are more likely to support policies that involve cross-country redistribu-
tion and that are managed by a European agency, and even more so as their identiﬁcation
with Europe strengthens. Conversely, individuals with primarily national identities sup-
port generous packages that do not involve cross-country redistribution and are adminis-
tered at the national level; these patterns hold more strongly the more exclusive their
national identity is. Localists, in turn, are situated in between, supporting generous pack-
ages, but do not express such a strong preference for country-level administration and are
indifferent to cross-country redistribution.
This research certainly falls short of exhausting the study of determinants of prefer-
ences towards EURS schemes. While we focus here on collective identiﬁcation patterns
we acknowledge that on certain dimensions (for instance, generosity of the packages)
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the individual attitudes towards equality or the unemployed may play an even more im-
portant role (see for instance van Oorschot et al., 2012). While such extension falls out-
side of the scope of this article and special issue, future research will investigate such
issues further. Nonetheless, the results presented above probably underestimate the degree
of polarization brought about by identiﬁcation patterns. While respondents were given the
choice of assigning a negative rating to all the packages (and indeed, about 6 per cent of
the respondents did so), the experiment lacks the option to simply reject any sort of EU-
level social policy (an option that some strict nationalists may have found attractive). In
other words, the experimental design includes a built-in attenuation bias, in the absence of
which the cleavage between European and nationalist or localist identiﬁers would have
likely been even stronger.
While our ﬁndings have shed light on preferences for a speciﬁc form of European so-
cial policy – EURS – the evidence also suggests that the design features of EU-level
social-policy proposals are likely to play a major role in determining support. However,
different policies may have very different detailed designs. For instance, while our data
and analysis gauge a very wide range of EURS alternatives, they do not experimentally
evaluate fullyﬂedged European unemployment beneﬁt schemes linked to individuals’ em-
ployment status alone, not their country-level employment performance. Nonetheless, our
ﬁndings have important implications for research and policy-making. We corroborate the
long-standing view that collective identities matter in social policy preferences and we
show that collective identiﬁcation can have very different implications for the popularity
of different EU-level social policy dimensions.
Thus, while it may be unsurprising that European identiﬁers are generally more sup-
portive of European social policy than exclusive nationalists, our ﬁndings also suggest
that even individuals with exclusive national identities are ready to support EURS as long
as it does not involve cross-country redistribution and as long as the funds are managed
by the member states rather than by an EU body. This suggests that there may be two
pathways to European social policy: one based on fullyﬂedged, cross-country solidarity
and one based on EU regulatory powers in the ﬁeld of social policy backed by a common
insurance, the latter possibly being supported even by those citizens who might be reluc-
tant to approve EU integration. Hence, our study reveals that room for manoeuvre is
available to policy-makers to address the fundamental asymmetry of the EU between mar-
ket integration and national social policies (Scharpf, 2002), by developing European un-
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